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A frequently cited explanation for why sterilized interventions may affect exchange rates
is that these interventions signal central banks' future monetary policy intentions. This
explanation presumes that central banks in fact hack up interventions with subsequent changes
in monetary policy. We empirically examine this hypothesis using data on market observations
of U.S. intervention together with monetary policy variables, and exchange rates. We sirongly
reject the hypothesis that interventions convey no signal. However, we also find that in some
episodes, intervention signalled changes in monetary policy in the opposite direction of the
conventional signalling story. This finding can explain why in some periods exchange rates
moved in the opposite direction of that suggested by intervention.
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Division of Monetary Affairs Wharton School
Board of Governors of the University of Pennsylvania
Federal Reserve System Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367
Washington, DC 20551 and NEER1. Introduction
The potential effects of foreign exchange intervention upon exchange rate behavior
has been an important issue of debate in both academic and policy—making circles since the
end of the Bretton Woods system. As a result, a great deal of research has documented
how exchange rates respond to foreign exchange intervention, finding quite mixed results)
For example, depending upon the sample period, regressions of exchange rate movements
upon intervention have either found strong effects of intervention, no effects of
intervention, or even movements of exchange rates in the opposite direction of that
suggested by the intervention.
Understanding these varied results clearly requires an explanation for how
interventions affect the exchange rate.Since major central banks typically sterilize the
monetary effects of interventions, changes in the relative money supphes cannot provide
the explanation. One proposition that recognizes that interventions are sterilized is the
so—called "signalling hypothesis," first proposed by Mussa (1981)2 Subsequently, some
empirical studies have emphasired that intervention may affect the exchange rate by
signalling and Federal Reserve publications have even claimed signalling to be a reason for
intervening.3
This explanation posits that intervention signals changes in future monetary policy.
It says that central banks signal a more contractionary future monetary policy by buying
domestic currency in the foreign exchange market today. The expectations of future
tighter monetary policy will make the exchange rate appreciate, even though the monetary
1For a survey of this literature, see Edison (1993).
2As drscribedinEdison (1993), an alternative explanation is the portfolio balance channel, Overall, the
studiesdiscussedin this survey findlittleempirical supportforthepropositionthat intervention could
havean econonically important effect through its portfolio effects upon private sector net wealth.
3For empirical studies discussing signalling, see tlominguez (1992) s.s well s-s other references in the
survey by Edison (1993). Signalling has bcen noted as a reason for intervening in the New York Federal
Reserve Bulletin (1991) and has been used as a reason against intervention at Federal Open Market
Connittee meetings (Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Cornorsittee, August 1989).effects of the intervention are offset. Of course, this explanation presumes that central
banks in fact back up interventions with subsequent changes in monetary policy.
In this paper, we empirically examine this last hypothesis. We test the signalling
story using data on market observations of U.S. intervention together with U.S. monetary
policy variables from 1985 to 1990. We test whether interventions by the Federal Reserve
today imply changes in monetary policy in the future.4 We then ask whether intervention
provides a significant signal of future changes in monetary policyrnterestingly, we
strongly reject the hypothesis that intervention provides no information about future
monetary policy.
However, intervention can provide useful information about future monetary policy
even if current interventions are systematically associated with changes in monetary policy
in the opposite direction to the one suggested by the signalling story. For example, laying
domestic currency in the foreign exchange market today may be correlated with future
expansionary monetary policy. In this case, interventions may provide a signal in the
oppotlc direction to that suggested by the standard signalling story.
To examine this possibility, we develop a methodology in which interventions can
signal correctly or incorrectly the change in future monetary policy. Strikingly, when we
back out the time—varying behavior of the information process inherent in the intervention
signals, we find that most of the information content comes from incorrect signaJs.5 Thus,
altbough interventions provide significant information about future monetary policy during
our sample, this information is frequently inconsistent with the direction suggested by the
signallIng hypothesis.
This evidence suggests a possible interpretation for the typical empirical findings
4lCIein and Rosengren (195t) also erarnine this question by looking at the relationship between
intervention and discount rate rhanges across the Group of Three countries.
5Domiogues (19s2) alasinvestigateswhether foreign exchange intervention signals correctly future
monetarypolicy by studyingthe Fedinterventionpolicyitsthe1977—1981 period. Intercstingly, she also
finds that intervention did not always conveythecorrectinformation aboutfuturemonetary policy.
2that intervention affects the exchange rate over some periods but not others. Our analysis
suggests that intervention will affect the exchange rate differently depending upon whether
the intervention was viewed as a correct or incorrect signal. To evaluate this possibility,
we examine exchange rate movements on the days following intervention. Strikingly, we
find that interventions preceding significant movements in the exchange rate in the
direction intended by the authorities were also interventions perceived as conveying correct
signals. On the other hand, interventions preceding significant movements in the exchange
rate in the opposite direction of the policy intention were perceived as conveying incorrect
signals.This evidence suggests that the sample dependent nature of the results from
regressing exchange rate movements on intervention may come from the sample dependent
nature of the commitments of monetary policy to exchange rate targets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly describes the
signalling hypothesis of intervention and the general behavior of U.S. monetary and
intervention policies from 1985to1990.Section III describes the data used in the
estimation. As a benchmark case, Section IV estimates a regime—switching process for two
indicators of monetary policy withcut allowing traders to incorporate intervention as a
signal. Section V develops a regime—switching process for monetary policy where traders
can use intervention as a signal. Section VI examines the reaction of exchange rates to
intervention. Finally, Section VII presents the conclusions.
H. The Signalling Hypothesis, Monetary, and hstervention Policy
A. The Exchange Rate and the Signalling Hypothesis
The signalling hypothesis is very intuitive.According to standard models of
exchange rate determination, the exchange rate depends upon the relative supplies of
domestic and foreign monies. If traders in the market are forward—looking, then the
exchange rate depends upon the relative money supplies expected in the future as well.
3This relationship may he summarized as:
(1)5t =s(vt,xExt+i,Etxt+2,...)
where s is the exchange rate at time t (domestic currency per foreign currency), x, is a
measure of monetary policy, Et is the conditional expectation operator, and v is the set of
all other variables that affect the exchange rate, including past information. The signalling
hypothesis says that even though a sterilized intervention to buy domestic corrency may
not affect current monetary policy x, it will lead traders to expect tighter monetary policy
in the future. In other words, if x represents money supply, then Ex+ for some j>0
will be lower than before the intervention, and the exchange rate will appreciate today.
Obviously, the relationship in equation (1) holds for any model of exchange rate
determination that incledes expectations of future monetary policy. While we will not test
any particular exchange rate model irs this paper, it is instructive to consider one possible
example within this class of models, the asset market model of the exchange rate.6
Suppose that x is the measure of monetary policy while v summarizes all variables that
affect the exchange rate but are not under the control of the central bank. Then, the
exchange rate is the discounted present value of the expected course of futore monetary
policy and other fundamental variables.
St =(i_O)EO'Et(xt+. + vt+$t)
where 0 is a discount rate andis the information set available to market participants at
time t.
The signalling hypothesis presumes that an intervention at time t will be followed
by a future change in monetary policy relative to previous expectations. For example,
suppose the Fed intervenes by buying dollars and the signalling hypothesis holds true. In
for enmpls, Mussa (t982) or Frrnlrrl sod Mussa (1980). For a rscsnt esrspirical study finding that
Iii model may hold over long horizons, see Mark (1992).
4this case, defining cl as the information set 4excludingthis intervention, the following
relationship would hold:
=(1o)E0o'Et(xt+. + vt+lst) <(l_O)iEo $E(xt+. + vI
Since domestic monetary policy will be expected to be lower in the future given
intervention, the domestic curreocy appreciates relative to its level if no intervention had
occurred.
Thus, the signalling hypothesis relies on the presumption that the market expects
future monetary pclicy to change upon observing intervention. If traders use information
efficiently, they will not ;nterpret intervention as a signal unless monetary pulley indeed
changes in a systematic way following intervention. We will examine this hypothesis below
using data on market ohservations of foreign exchange market intervention by the Federal
Reserve together with measures of monetary policy from September 1985 until February
1990.
At the outset we should emphasize that while the terminology "signalling" has
become popular, it may be misleading. The relationship between intervention and future
monetary policy changes need not arise from a strategic decision of the Fed to provide any
information to the market. The interesting issue is whether interventions provide market
participants with useful information about future policy. Fur the following analysis, we
leave aside the issue of whether this information is intentional on the part of the Fed or not
but retain the term "signalling" to be consistent with the literature. We will later return
to discuss the likelihood that this information signalling was intentinnal in light of our
results.
B. MonetaryPolicyand Monetory Aggregates During the Late 198 Us
In order to test the signalling hypothesis, we require a measure of monetary policyover the period of intervention by the Federal Reserve in the 1980s. The Federal Reserve
resumed intervention during 1985 after a long hiatus during the first Reagan
administration. The impetus for an intervention policy came after the Plaza Meeting in
September 1985 when the central banks of the Group of Three cnuntries agreed to
intervene more heavily tn push down the value of the dollar. We therefore begin our
sample at this time. On the other hand, a conflict between the Fed and the Treasury on
the issne of intervention led the Fed to quit intervening on its own account during 1990,
requiring future interventions during that year to be carried out by the Treasury. For this
reason, our study ends in February 1990,
The ideal approach to evaluating monetary policy would be to estimate a reaction
function that depended upon key economic variables of importance to the monetary
authorities and then ronsider policy based upon this function. Unfortunately, the brevity
of our sample period precludes estimating such a function since it would depend upon
variables observed monthly or even quarterly, such as income inflation, and the trade
balance. In light of this constraint, we will directly use monetary policy variables instead,
Therefore, it is important to examine whether the behavior of monetary policy indicators
during this period was consistent with other accounts of U.S. monetary policy. For this
reason, we next provide a brief description of monetary policy behavior and its relationship
with monetary indicators.
The stance of U.S. monetary policy changed significantly during the 1980s. For
most of the early 1980s, monetary policy was considered quite contractionary as U.S.
interest rates hit historic peaks. However, by the beginning of our sample in 1985, the U.S.
monetary policy had become relatively expansionary.
Figure 1 shows some measures of monetary policy. The top panel plots weekly
observations of Ml, M2 together with the Federal Funds rate. As the picture illustrates,
the growth rate of Ml accelerated during 1985 and 1986. Over the four quarters of 1986,
Ml ballooned at a 15.3 percent growth rate, while M2 rose 9.4 percent. At the same time,the Federal Funds rate trended downward, in tandem with other interest rates. From
mid—1984 to the end of 1986, most interest rates declined 5 to 6 percentage points and
many short—term interest rates were essentially cut in half. These downward movements
were accommodated by two discount rate cuts in April and August of 1986. As Figure 1
shows, the Federal Funds rate reached a trough io early 1987, around the same time that
the rate of increase of Ml and M2 began to level off.
Monetary policy was quite different during the following period from roughly 1987
through late 1989. Largely in response to an increase in inflation, the Federal Reserve
began tightening reserves in the second quarter of 1987. As a result Ml and M2 rose just
3.5 percent during 1987, The top panel of Figure 1 shows the sharp deceleration in the
growth rate in Ml. At the same time, the Federal Funds rate began an upward trend that
would continue into 1989. This tightening of monetary policy was accentuated with
discount rate increases in October 1987, August 1988, and February 1989.
It was not until the second half of 1989 that monetary policy may have eased
slightly. Concerned about the sluggish growth of the economy while remaining cautious
about inflation, the Federal Reserve began to increase the availabillty of reserves to
depositing institutions and the Federal Funds rate fell more than 1 372 percentage puints
by early January 199O. However, popular press accounts appeared quite divided over
whether monetary policy was in fact easing during late 1989, as we wlll discuss in more
detail below.
The narrow measures of monetary aggregates such as nonborrowed reserves tell a
similar story of the evolution of monetary policy. The lower panel of Figure 1 depicts
nonborrowed reserves, observed only hi—weekly, As the figure shows, nonborrowed reserves
moved quite closely with the broader monetary aggregates, Ml and M2, over this period.
See, the Economic Report of ite Preiident (1588), page 37.
See "Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations during 1989" in Federal Resene Bank of Nfw York
Qt,srterly Review, Spring 1990, I5 43—es.
7As a result, nonborrowed reserves suggest a similar pattern of expansionary monetary
poliry during the early part of our sample and a contraction beginning in 1987. We next
describe the behavior of intervention policy during this same period, before turning to the
empicical implementation.
C. Intervention and Monetarp Policy
The 11.5. followed an active intervention policy during much of the late 1980s.
Table I provides some summary information about intervention together with some
ind.icators of monetary policy. As described above, from 1985 through 1986 monetary
policy was relatively expansionary. During this period, the Fed intervened on twelve
occasions, primarily to scIl dollars. For example, after the Plaza meeting in September
1985, the U.S. sold 3.3 billion dollars (from September 23 to November 7 1985).
Intervention activity increased substantially from 1987 through 1989. Until mid
1988, most of the interventions were dollar purchases. For example, in the wake of the
Louvre Accord in February 1987, the Fed purchased 30 million dollars against marks to
support the doliar on March 11th. The Fed then intervened on a daily basis between
March 23 and April 6, 1987 buying another 3 biliion dollars. According to llominguez
(1990) the Fed coordinated these interventions with the Bank of Japan and several
European central banks. The U.S. continued to intervene in support of the dollar until
June 27, 1988.
At this point, intervention policy reversed course sharply, beginning the first of
several intervention policy reversals. From June 27 to September 26, 1988, the U.S. sold 5
billion dollars. However, this policy was reversed in the last quarter of 1988, during which
the Fed bought 2.6 billion dollars. On January 6, 1989, policy was once again reversed as
the Fed renewed heavy dollar selling intervention in the foreign exchange market. Thus,
the Fed was active on both the buying and seliing side of the foreign exchange marketduring the period, as Table 1 summarizes.9
ifi. The Data
In order to examine the signalling hypothesis, we require both a measure of
monetary policy and public observations of intervention. In this section, we discuss the
data issues involved with these measures.
First we must address the issue of which measure of monetary policy to use. There
is certainly no agreement in the literature about which indicator best reflects the stance of
monetary policy. A plethora of papers use broad measures of money supply as the
indicators. For example, Mishkin (1981,1982) and Cochrane (1989) use Ml; while Melvin
(1983) uses M2, and Reichenstein (1987) uses both Ml and M2. However, some authors
such as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a,1992b) and Strongin (1992) have argued that
movements in broad monetary aggregates can be misleading measures of mnnetary policy
since they confound money demand shocks with money supply shocks and have suggested
using nonborrowed reserves as the indicator of monetary policy.Still others, such as
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Goodfriend (1992), have argued for the Federal Funds
rate as the monetary indicator. They claim that movements in the Federal Funds rate are
genuine policy changes, not simply endogenous responses of the Federal Funds rate to
changes in the economy. Acrording to this view, reserve demand shocks are fully
accommodated by open market operations, so that these shocks have no effect on the
Federal Funds rate, which is mainly determined by policy decisions.
To check whether our results are robust to different measures of monetary policy we
will test the signalling hypothesis using different measures of monetary policy. Given the
above discussion, the obvious candidates are nonborrowed reserves, Ml, and the Federal
Funds Rate. Unfrtnnately, narrow monetary aggregates such as the monetary base and
5Dorninguez andPrankel(1992) provide a detailed survey of intervention over thin period.
9nonborro wed reserves are only available hi—weekly. Since our sample is short, we cannot
use hi—weekly series and therefore confine the study to Ml and the Federal Funds rate.
Despite this limitation we will show below that the results are quite similar between the
two extreme measures examined. This finding taken together with the evidence in Figure t
suggests that the results are likely to be similar for nonborrowed reserves as well.
The specific series we study are the Federal Funds rate and Ml obtained from the
Federal Reserve Board data bank. The Federal Funds rate is the weekly average of the
daily rate, while Ml is the average stock of money for the week ending on Mondays.
We now consider the intervention data. To test the signalling hypothesis, we must
use information known to traders. Although traders frequently know when central banks
are intervening, monetary authorities rarely provide information about the magnitudes at
the time of intervention. Furthermore, central banks occasionally try to conceal their
intervention operations. These interventions will usually not be recognired by the market
and hence it seems highly unlikely that these interventions could be signalling anything at
all.
For these reasons, we use an intervention series based upon reports by traders on
the day of the intervention. These data were collected from accounts in the Wall Street
Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times.This data series consists of
days in which the Federal Reserve was observed intervening by traders. These days axe
further decomposed into days when the Fed either bought or sold dollars.
IV. A Markov—Switcliing Model for Monetary Policy without Intervention as a Signal
As described above, monetary policy in the United States during the late lOSOs
appeared to alternate between relatively expansionary and contractionary regimes. To
tODomingura and Frankol (1992) and Klein (1992) find that newspaper accounts were largely accurate in
picking up days of actualinterventionduring this period, Similar to those studies, newspaper accounts
in our sample Lend to uoderetate the number of days of intervention due to concealed interventions,
while counterfartual reports of intervention are rare.
10evaluate whether intervention provided a significant signal about this policy change, we
will first consider how expectations of this monetary change would have evolved if market
participants did nut use intervention as a signal.This model will provide a useful
benchmark for comparison when we incorporate intervention as a signal in the next section.
To capture the changes in mooetary policy behavior, we estimated a univariate
process for the monetary indicators allowing their evolution to follow two regimes, Rt =
for i =0 1. Conditional upcn each of these regimes, the process is autoregressive of order
• in first differences as given in the following equation:
(2)Lxxi = +mEi3AXt m + N(0,a2)
where x is either the logarithm of money supply) mt, or the Federal Funds rate, f. Also,
is the drift of the monetary indicator in regime i, 5arethe parameters of the AR
process for Ax, andis the innovatioo in monetary policy. The innovations are assumed
lid and normally distributed with variancein both regimes. For expositiorsal purposes,
we will define Regime 1 as the relatively expansionary monetary regime. Hence, if money
supply is the monetary indicator we normalire while for the Federal Funds rate, we
choose regimes such that
The probability of switching between these two regimes is governed by the following
stationary probability matrix. II
Rtl=lRti=0
(3) R=1 (i—A) A
R=0
A (i—A)
Tradersdo not observe these regimes, R1, directly but must infer them from the
ttWe also estimated a more general version of the model where the varianres and the trazssition
• probabilities were state—dependent. Likelihood ratio tests could not reject that the variances and the
probabilities were the same and we therefore present only this more parsimonious specifiration in the
text.
11current information set. For this benchmark model without intervention as a signal we
simply assume that the traders' information set in confined to current and past
observations on the monetary indicator.This information set is given by=
{AxAxt1,sbx1} for alternatively, x=m (log(M1)) and x=f (Federal Funds rate). For
this benchmark model, we can use Hamilton's (isss) nun—linear filter to estimate the
process in equation (2) and (3) using either weekly data for U.S. Ml money supply or the
weekly average Federal Funds rate for the period September 23, 1985 to February 2, 1990.
Details of this procedure are provided in the appendix.
Table 2 reports the results of this estimation. In the top panel, we report the
results using Ml as the policy variable. Based upon time series analysis, we found that Ml
is best described as a random walk process with changing drift coefficients. Interestingly,
the model indeed captures an expansionary and a contractiunary monetary regime. During
the expansionary monetary regime, money supply grows at 0.33 percent per week while in
the contractionary monetary regime money supply grows at only 0.048 percent per week.
Another feature cf the model is that the transition probability, A, is very small at about 1
percent, indicating that both regimes display considerable persistence.In fact, the
estimated probability implies that the expected duration of the monetary regimes is
approximately 106 weeks.
Notably, the estimates using the Federal Funds rate display similar characteristics,
as reported in the bottom panel of Table 2. The first difference of the Federal Funds rate
is best described by a first—order autoregressive process with regime—dependent drift and
AR(l) coefficient. In Regime 0, the drift is positive (b =0.035)while in Regime 1 it
becomes negative (Ig =—0.044).This process of alternating positive and negative trends
in the Federal Funds growth rate supports the notion that monetary policy alternated
between contractinnary and expansionary monetary regimes over the period. Similar to the
results using money supply, the implied probability of switching regimes using the Federal
Funds rate as indicator is very small. However, in this case, the expected !engtb of the
12monetary regimes is slightly shorter at 77 weeks.
As noted above, the estimates assume that traders do not known with certainty the
monetary regime. On the other hand, traders can make inferences about the monetary
regime using the information available on the monetary indicator. For example, they can
assign probabilities to whether the process was in Regime 0 or 1 at any given date t based
upon currently available information. In other words, as the information set $changes,so
I:!
dotraders' assessed probabilities of the corrent regime as well as their priors of the regime
in the next period through the relationship:
Prob(Rr1I41) =Prior(R1=1),
where Prob(ztIti) is the probability of z conditioned on the time t information set, 4',and
Prior(z) is the prior probability of z for traders entering period t. Using our estimates as
well as the evolution of the monetary indicator variables, we can generate these
probabilities.
Figure 2 shows these probahilities. The top panel shows the implicit prior of being
in an expansionary monetary regime using money supply as the monetary policy indicator,
while the bottom panel reports the probability implicit in the Federal Funds rate model.
Strikingly, the predictions of the model with both indicators are consistent with the
stylized evidence of monetary policy discussed above. In particular, the probability of an
expansionary regime is quite high through moch of 1986, but then drops to below 50
percent during earLy 1987. Most of the latter part of the sample is characterized by a fairly
tow probability of the expansionary regime. If we use the criterion of assigning observation
to Regime 1 if the conditional probability is larger than 1/2, then these probabilities
classify the following observations as belonging to the expansionary monetary regime.
13Expansionary Monetary Regime Episodes
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Interestingly, the two different classifications of monetary policy in the last semester
of 1989 by the two different measures appears consistent with the confusion over policy in
the popular press due in part to conflicting statements by the various government
offlcials.tl In early October, reports of an easing of monetary policy were mixed with
contradictory statements that policy had not eased. l The following week Fed Chairman
Greenspan made statements on a trip to Moscow that the markets interpreted as a message
that tight monetary policy would be maintained leading to a rise in the dollar)4 Kowever,
the next day, traders appeared divided over whether tight or easy monetary policy would
ensne.° The perception that monetary policy had remain relatively contractionary was
reinforced by Chairman Greenspan's statements in congressional testimony. The London
Finoncial Times stated, "Mr. Creenspan's [...]commentswere seen by observers as
highlighting the Fed's current caution about any early substantial easing of U.S. monetary
policy and of interest rates" ('Greenspan Warns that U.S. Inflation Rate is Too High,"
London Ftmoncinl Time.s, October 25, 1989). Thus, the conflicting evidence from our two
tlDorntnguea and Frankel (1992) alsoargue that therewassomeconfusion aver the direction of monetary
poLicy during late 1989.
1lFor instance, an article in the London Financial Ti,nes reported that the moat recent FOMO meeting
record of policy actions suggested both a "directive that tilted toward monetary easing" and that scene
members objected stating "a hta.s io the trew directive towards ease might lead to a misreading of policy
in the context of an unacceptahly high rate of inflation" ("Evidence Mounts of Turn in Dollar Trend,"
London Financial Times, October 9, 1989).
tt"Tokyo Discount Rate Rise May Not Be Enough" in Lsndsn Financial Times, Ortoher 12, 1988.
tFor example, the London Financial Times stated, "traders were divided on whether the Federal Resery
had eased its monetary stance" ("Rates Up On Lawson,5 Fioaoriai Times, October 23, 1989).
14different measures of monetary policy also appears consistent with the contradictory
information received by market observers at the time.
Overall, oor estimates are consistent with other evidence of U.S. monetary policy
discussed in Section II.During 1985 through 1986 monetary policy was relatively
expansionary.Except for isolated periods, monetary policy was considerably more
cootractionary from 1987 to 1989..
V. Is Intervention a Signal of Future Shifts in Monetary Policy?
The evidence above, consistent with discussions in both official documents and the
popular press, suggests that monetary policy shifted from an expa.nsionary regime to a
contractionary regime during the sample period,In this section we ask whether
intervention provided a significant signal of this shift in policy. We begin by describing the
evolution of expected future monetary policy with intervention as a signal. We then
discuss the methodology for estimating the model as well as the results.
A. Expected Future Monetary Policy with Intervention as a Signal
We will address the question of whether intervention provides a signal of future
monetary policy in two different ways. First, does intervention provide a signal of future
monetary policy at all? For example, intervention may have nothing to do with future
monetary policy, so that traders would disregard information about intervention when
forming forecasts. To test this hypothesis, we will examine whether intervention at some
lag k is useful for predicting the current monetary regime, R. We will shortly describe
more precisely what we mean by past intervention. For the present, we will simply define
the event of this past intervention at t—k as S=1 and the event of no intervention at t—k
as S=O, In this context, the first way to ask if intervention signals future monetary policy
•is to ask whether S conveys any information about Rt.
A second way we will ask the question is: if intervention does provide information
15about future monetary policy, does intervention signal the correct direction of future
policy? For example interventions to buy dollars would suggest that the Federal Reserve
is more concerned about the value of the U.S. dollar and might reflect an intention to
pursue more contractionary monetary policy in the future. We will refer to this type of
intervention signals as "Correct Signals.'1 On the other hand, an intervention to buy
duliars may also be an attempt to bolster the value of the dollar when monetary policy is
actually expansiunary in the future. We call these types of iotervention signals "Wrong
Signals."11 Even though these interventions signal the wrong direction of future monetary
policy, systematic interventions of this type can be useful to traders in assessing the course
of futu.re policy."
A difficulty in assessing the nature of these two types of signals is that policy
intentions may vary over time with changing monetary leadership. There are several
reasons to suspect that these intentions may have changed during our sample period. First,
there were changes in governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Second, the opinions of the
Board members toward intervention appeared to change over time as evidenced by records
of policy actions of the FOMC. And, finally, the relationship between the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve evolved as well, as the Enard became more concerned about the nature
of signalling in tate 1988 and t989J
In order to incorporate some of the dynamics of potential changes in types of signals
as viewed by the market participants, we allow for different states of information signals
arising hum interventioo.9 For purposes of exposition, suppose first that the monetary
161n adopting thu terminology, we should emphasize that the words "correct" and "wrong" relate only to
whether the intervention is consistent with the signalling story or not. It is not intended to convey any
iudgcrnent about the appropriateness of the policy.
trof course, a recognition by the market that signals are in the opposite direction of future policy would
be detrimental to the usefulness of intervention on the part ci the central bank, An example of this
behavior during the sample will be discussed below.
t5We will discuss these issues in rnnrc detail in conjunctirn with the rrsults.
15The model described in this section is a generalization of the model developed in Kaminsky (5591).
a
igauthority intervenes every period (St=i for all t). At the time of intervention, t—k, the
authorities may have been following a correct"signallingpolicy defined by the regime C
whereinterventions signal correctly the direction of future policy, or a 'Wrong" policy
defined by W where interventions signal a change in monetary policy in the opposite
direction- In keeping with the Markov switching process for monetary policy above, we




Equation (4) describes the transition probability between correct and wrong signalling
regimes under the assumption that the monetary authority signals —through intervention—
every period. However, we have seen in Table 1 that the Fed chose not to intervene
(S=0) for long stretches of time during the period under examination. For example, there
was essentially no intervention by the Fed during 1986.If periods with and without
signalling alternate, it is necessary to specify the dynamics across these states too. It
seems implausible that traders who had not observed intervention for such a long period of
time would simple update the probability of the correctness of the signal according to
equation (4) based upon previous interventions that had taken place such a long time ago.
It appears mote reasonable to suppose thai traders view the probability of correct or
wrong signal differently when intervention does not occur for some time. To allow for this
possibility, we treat the probability of the correctness of the intervention signal if
intervention occurs after a period of no intervention as:
(s)Prob(Ct IS=l8=°= q
Prob(Wt[St=l,Stj=O) =(1—q)
In other words, if traders observe intervention potentially useful for understanding the
17current regime, 5=1 after no intervention in the previous period, 8t 1=0, they believe
that the intervention will be correct with probability q but wrong with probability (1—q).
We can now combine both the processes in (4) and (5) to provide a full transition






'w', p (l—p) (1—q)
Hence the complete signalling model ronsists of equations (2) and (3), and (6).
To specify the link between the potential evolution of signals in (6) and the process
for the monetary indicators in (2) and (3), we need to incorporate one last piece of
information: whether the intervention k periods ago was a dollar sale or purchase. For this
purpose, define an observation of intervention at time t—k as if the Federal Reserve
intervened by selling dollars or I k=0 if it intervened by buying dollars: A "Correct"
signal at time t—k about the monetary regime in some future period t implies a positive
2Note that since intervention is ubarryrd with a lag, tisknown at timet.Therefore, no transition
probabilityneed bepenified between S and S-- If St were uncertain, however, we could easily







t01 a01 (1r10) Irelationship between and Rt=1, or more generally between I k=i and Rt=i. On
the other hand, a "Wrong" state Wt implies a correspondence between I k=i and Rtj,
where ji.More formally, C ={ltk=i IR1=i;i=O,1} and Wt =1t—k='IRtj;
i#j,i,j=O,1}. Note that the full information set of traders now also includes the occurrence
of interveotioo aod its direction; i.e., 4t={Axt,St,ItkLsxl,Sl,Ilk}.
The evolution of the intervention signal together with the monetary regime
determine expected future monetary policy. For example, note that the monetary regime
affects expectations of monetary policy since by (2) and (3), the expected monetary policy
next period is given by:
(7)EtLXxt+i= t_)[1_Pri0r(t+i=1)I+( 5+Lo5jaxt)Prior(Rt+i=I)
These priors are in turn transition probabilities weighted averages of the posterior
probabilities of being in each regime based upon information at time t including the
intervention signal, S, the direction of the intervention, I, and the monetary indicator1 x.
The appendix gives details about the full evolution of the joint system of intervention,
signals, aod monetary indicators.
B. Empirical Results
We now describe briefly the estimation of the system described above. Using the
equations for the priors of the monetary regime, the conditional posteriors in terms of the
likelihood fnnctinn and the previous period priors, as well as the evolution of the
probabilities of the signalling regime, we cao construct the joint likelihood function of





Weestimated this model by maximizing this function numerically with respect to the
unknown parameters: ig, ä,
2,p,and q. For the initial period, we assumed a
diffuse prior on both the monetary regime and the nature of the signal. Thua we set the
initial priors (Prior(R1='i), Prior(C1 S=i)) equal to 0.5.
To estimate the model, we also needed tu make an assumption about the lag at
which past intervention is useful for predicting the current monetary regime. For a signal
to provide valuahle information to traders, it must precede monetary policy changes in a
proximate and consistent manner. Since the Fed can provide the pubhc information about
monetary policy intentions through other methods such as statements in the record of
policy actions of the FCMC published approximately every six weeks, it seems unlikely
that the lag of this signal can be very long. We therefore experimented with different
values of k. In particular, we estimated the model with kesi week and k=3 weeks. Since
the results were essentially the same, we just report the results with k,=l.2t
Table 3 reports the estimation results. In estimating the signalling models we
imposed the result found in Table 2 that money supply follows a random walk with a drift
and that the first difference of the Federal Funds rate follows an AR(i) process.
Consistent with our findings for the model without intervention as a signal in Table 2, the
growth rate of money in the expansionary regime is significantly higher than the growth
rate in the contraotionary regime. In particular,is about 0.4 percent weekly or about
13.8 percent annualized while tig,itscounterpart in the contractionary regime, is only
about 0.06 percent weekly or 3 percent annualized in the contractionary monetary regime.
The results using the Federal Funds rate also support the hypothesis of a switch in
monetary regime, although the estimates are less precise. Still, we find that in Regime 1,
ttOf jrintervention provides information about monetary policy at a one week horizon, byt
iterating thc Marlcov process forward, it also provides forecsst of monetary policy regimes in any future
period.
20the drift rate is negative and equal to —0.025, while in the contractionary Regime 0, the
drift is a positive 0.017. As before, the transition probability of the monetary regime, A, is
quite small.
The signalling model provides two new parameters: the transition probability
between the "Correct" and "Wrong" signalling regimes, pand the probability of a
"Correct" signalling regime given no recent interventions, q. As Table 3 shows, the
transition probability p is close to zero. On the other hand, the probability of a correct
signalling regime given no past intervention, q, is larger but less than 0.5.
A. convenient feature of oor framework is that we can test the signalling hypothesis
in a straightforward and intuitive way. Specifically, if the aothorities appear to switch
between correct and wrong signals with even odds, then observations of intervention will
convey no meaningful signal of future monetary policy. Formally, this behavior is identical
to a transition probability between the correct and wrong signalling states, p that equals
1/2. Also, when interventions have not occurred recently, a new intervention will not
convey any information if the probability of a correct or wrong signal is also 1J2. Thus, a
test of the null hypothesis that intervention provides no signal is a test of the constraint
p=q= 1/2.
In this case the joint density function for Axt,and 'tk in (8) will just be a
function of the marginal density function for the monetary indicator (money supply or the
federal Funds rale) alone:
f(sxt,St,ltk LhX1,SpI1 hXl,Sl,1l lc =0.5f(Axt
I
Inaddition, the conditional probabilities of monetary regimes will depend only upon past
values of the monetary indicator. From these facts, we can construct the likelihood ratio
test of the constrained and unconstrained models,
(9) LRT =2{ln(f(Ltxt,SS,It k',' Ax1,51,11 k)) —[ln(f(Ax1x1))-i-n1n(1j2)]}
21T
where n is the number of times there was intervention in the sample (i.e. n =tSiSt).
Since the difference between the two models involves two constraints (p=l/2 and q=l/2),
the likelihood ratio test is distributed aswith two degrees of freedom,
Table 3 reports this test statistic along with its marginal significance level in
parenthesis. As the table shows, the likelihood ratio test is quite large and the null
hypothesis is strongly rejected at all standard significance levels,Thus, intervention
provides a significant signal about future changes in monetary policy.
C. The Evolution of the Monetary Regimes and Perceptions of Policy Intentions
The estimates of the model provide an evolution of the probabilities of the
expansionary monetary regime as well as of the correctness of the signal. Figure 3 depicts
the prior probabilities of the expansionary regime (Rtl) based upon lagged intervention
and the previous period's monetary indicator (money supply in the top panel and Federal
Funds rate in the bottom panel). This series is plotted along with the prior probabilities of
correct signals.
When money supply is the indicator of monetary policy the probahilities of the
expansionary regime follow a pattern similar to the ones without interveotion as a signal
described in Figure 2. The probahility of an expansionary regime increases during the first
part of the sample and then remain high through the second week of 1987. Thereafter, the
probability of an expansionary regime is low with occasional temporary increases, such as
during the week following the October 1987 U.S. stock market crash,When the
intervention signal is used, however, the probabilities of being in an expansionary monetary
regime seem to pinpoint monetary policy with greater precision.
On the other hand, when the Federal Funds rate is used as the monetary indicator,
the path of the probabilities of being in an expansionary monetary regime changes more
significantly when intervention is need as a signal. For example, while the probabilities
22excluding intervention in Figure 2 classified the second semester of 1989 as an expansionary
monetary regime, the probabilities including intervention in Figure 3 do not, Strikingly,
the probabilities of an expansionary regime using intervention as a signal given in Figure 3
are much more similar across measures of monetary indicators than are those ignoring
intervention given in Figure 2. Even the end of 1989 is now perceived as a contractionary
regime by both measures. The heavy intervention to sell dollars appeared to be a
'leaning-against—thewind" policy in response to an appreciating doflar. The combination
of this information in intervention together with monetary policy measures helped to
classify monetary policy as contractionary. Below, we discuss this period in more detaiL
Using the critericn described before the probabilities of being in an expansionary
monetary regime classify the observations as follows:
Expansionary Monetary Regime Episodes




Figure 3 also plots the probability of a "Correct" signal as circles.Since
intervention can provide a signal only after intervention occurs, this series is not
continuous- As we have not restricted the probability of a "Correct Signals" regime to
depend en previous "signalling strategy" when intervention had not occurred in the recent
past, the prior probability of a correct signal during solitary weeks of intervention is equal
to 0.423 =q when money supply is the monetary indicator, and 0.302 =q when the Federal
funds rate is the monetary indicator as reported in Table 3.Interestingly, periods of
concentrated intervention generally show the persistence of "Correct" or "Wrong" states
captured by the estimation. The only exception to the high persistence in correct signals
was the six—week episode of intervention in the fall of 1987 when the probability of a
23correct signal dipped down near zero but upon observiiig several more weeks of money
supply, increased to near one. Even this exception is not observed when the Federal Funds
rate is osed as indicator.
Mcst of the intervention took place when monetary policy was contractionary.
During some of these intervention episodes, such as the one after the Louvre Accord, the
Fed intervened to support the dollar presumably signalling a contractionary monetary
stance. It is these episodes of intervention that the model classifies as belonging to the
"Correct" signalling regime. But intervention did not always signal a tight monetary
policy. For example, when the Federal Reserve intervened in 1989, it always sold dollars
(see Table 1) seemingly signalling an expansionary monetary regime according to the
signalling hypothesis. Similarly, the dcllar sales by the Federal Reserve in the second
semester of 1988 would have signalled an expansionary monetary regime in contrast to the
actual monetary policy.The model captures this apparent contradiction between
intervention and thonetary policy as a "Wrong" signalling regime from the second semester
of 1988 through 1989.
To examine the evolution of the correctness of the signals more closely, Figure 4
plots the updated posterior probabilities based opon observations of monetary policy within
that week. Thus, the posterior probabilities allow us to see how traders updated their
priors of the correctness of the signal after viewing the actual change in money supply or
Federal Funds rate during the period. In addition to the same concentration of signals
found before, Figure 4 shows that periods of low priors of the correct signalling regime were
frequently followed with zero probability of correct signalling after observing the monetary
indicator during the period, and vire versa. The intervention episodes beginning in early
1989 particularly display this pattern.
0. The Estimates in Light of Other Measures of Federal ReseruePolicy
We next consider additional information about Federal Reserve behavior over this
'.1
24period both to verily our results and to offer a different perspective of their interpretation.
As monetary policy became more contractionary and remained so well into 1989,
this tightening led to a relative strengthening of the dollar. Due to concerns by the
Treasury about this strengthening, the U.S. intervened heavily to sell dollars for much of
this period- Starting on June 27, 1988 the U-S. sold dollars in the foreign exchange market,
totalling 5 billion dollars by September 26. A second round of heavy dollar selling began
on January 6, 1989, Since monetary policy remained relatively tight for this period, this
combination of policies indicates that interventions were systematically in the opposite
direction of the signalling story- This pattern shows up as "Wrong"signalsin our
estimates.
Even more strildngly, ducuments of the Federal Reserve also imply precisely the
pattern of signalling we bend above. During early 1989, debate increased among the
governors on the Federal Reserve Board concerning intervention and the appropriateness of
its signal toward monetary policy. By the P0MG meeting on May 16, 1989, intervention
had become ao important issue of discussion as the !arge purchases of foreign currency
assets by the New York Federal Reserve Bank had increased holding of these assets beyond
the legal limit.Governor LaWare dissented in a vote to extend the limit on foreign
currency holdings to "convey skepticism about intervention" (Record of Policy Actions of
the FOMO, May 16, 1989). The continued dollar sales meant that intervention was again
an issue at the June 14FOMCmeeting, when the limit on foreign currency holding had to
be increased again. By the August 22 P0MG meeting more governors were critical of the
intervention policy. Governors Angeli and Johnson dissented on a move that would allow
further intervention stating "intervention confuses market participants concerning the
policy commitment toward price stability' (Record of Policy Actions of the FOMC,
August 22, 1989).
Due to this controversy, most of the interventions by the end of 1989 were no longer
conducted on the Federal Reserve's account, but rather on the Treasury's account. From a
25total of dollar—selling intervention in the first four months of i990 of 2.4 billion dollar, cnly
675 million dollars were on the Federal Reserves own account. With growing concern
among FOMC members about conflicting signals sent to the market through intervention
from March 5, 1990 through the rest of the year all interventions were for the Treasury's
account alone.
This period of conflict between the Treasury and the Fed did not go unnoticed by
the markets or the popular press.In mid—October 1989, a newspaper reported that
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady "conceded the existence of differences over interest rate
and dollar policy between the administration and Federal Reserve."22 The potential impac
of these differences also arose in the late October congressional testimony of Chairman
Greenspan. Fnllcwing reports of disputes among policymakers, including public dissent by
two Fed governors, he pointed to the limits on how far intervention in the foreign exchange
market could influence the level of the dollar.23
Clearly, this arcount of the Federal Reserve's concern about "Wrong" signals
accords with our estimates above. This evidence and our estimates indicate the Federal
Reserve was unlikely to he intentionally signalling future monetary policy changes.
Rather, it appears more likely that interventions were a reaction to the strengthening of
the dollar, while the Fed continued maintaining a contractionary monetary policy. Thus
the "signal't of intervention in the opposite direction from actual future monetary policy
was probably unintentional.
Despite the likelihood that these signals were not intentional, we have shown that
intervention provided statistically significant information about the course of future
monetary policy. If so, it seems likely that market participants would have incorporated
information about whether the intervention was based upon "Correct" or "Wrong"
information states.In the next section, we provide suggestive evidence that foreign
22"Brady PlayG Down Policy Rift," Lrndoe Fin,,nciai Tunes, Ortober 13, 1969.
23"Creenspan Warni That U.S. Inflation Is Too High," London .Ftnamcial Tiotes, October 26, 1989.
26exchange market traders were informed about the potential signal in intervention.
VI. Reaction of Exchange Rates to Intervention: Some Suggestive Evidence
According to the simple model considered in Section II, the exchange rate depends
upon current and expected future changes in monetary policy as weU as other fundamental
variables not controlled by the central bank. Repeating for convenience, the basic equation
was given as:
According to this model an intervention of dollar sales based upon a "Correct° signal will
lead to a higher expected futore monetary policy, Etxt+, relative to no intervention. Of
course, since the exchange rate depends upon the current and expected future levels of
other variables, v1 and Etvt+ as well as current monetary policy given by xt, and since
interventions may arise in response to these variables, intervention will not necessarily
move the exchange rate at all.However, to the extent that "Correct" signalling
interventions do move the exchange rate, rational traders would tend to depredate the
value of the dollar following dollar sales. Thus, if we looked at movements in the exchange
rate on the day following "Correct" intervention, we would expect to find either no
significant effect or else a significant movement in the direction intended by the
intervention (i.e., appreciation if dollar purchases, depreciation if dollar sales).
On the other hand, if interventions are perceived as conveying information that
future monetary policy will be in the opposite direction, then the same logic applies in the
reverse. Dollar sale ioterventions will lead traders to expect tight monetary policy in the
future. This new information will either not be sufficiently significant to move the dollar
or else will significantly push the dollar up.
Thus, the tendency for intervention to affect the exchange rate will depend upon
27whether the information is perceived as in the "Correct" or "Wrong" direction. At a
suggestive level, we would expect that exchange rate movements following "Correct"
interventions should tend to induce exchange rate movements in the direction implied by
the operation if at all, while "Wrong' interventions should tend to induce exchange rate
movements in the opposite direction, if at all./
Toconsider this relationship, we examined the response to intervention news of the
Deutsche mark/dollar and the Japanese yen/dollar rate. We used daily data on
intervention and exchange rates. Exchange rates are quoted at noon in the New York
market74 The reaction was measured as the change in the relevant exchange rate on the
day of the intervention. Since the discussion above revealed that exchange rates should
react differently depending on the information state, we further divided the sample
between episodes with correct and incorrect signalling as indicated by the prior
probabillties of the Federal funds rate model reported in Figure 3 (the results hased upon
Ml were similar).
Table 4 meports the results based upon the different years, decomposed according to
dollar selling and dollar buying interventions. The evidence is remarkably consistent with
the implications of the analysis above. For "Days of SelLing Dollars Intervention" under
"Correct Signals," the dollar either depreciated significantly as in 1985, or else was not
significantly changed. By sharp contrast, when these same dollar sale interventions were
perceived as "Wrong Signals" (under the third and fourth columns), the exchange rate
significantly appreciated in every year except 1985 when the effect was insignificant.
Further evidence of this phenomenon is provided by the dollar purchases
intervention summarized in the last four columns of Table 4. When the signal was viewed
as correct, the intervention lead to a significant appreciation in the dollar relative to the
yen in 1988 as would be predicted by the model. In all other cases, the relationship is
2tMost U.S. intervention takes place in the rnnrntng to have a stronger impact during the overlap period
when European markets are suIt open.
28insignificant, On the other hand, when the signal was viewed as incorrect, dollar buying
interventions led to significant dollar depreciation against both currencies in 1987 and
insignificant depreciation in 1988.
In all of these cases, significant movements in the exchange rates following
interventions depended crucially upon whether the interventions were viewed as conveying
correct or incorrect signals of future monetary policy.This evidence suggests an
interpretation of the typical finding in the literature that the effectiveness of intervention
appears to depend heavily upon the sample period.25 During periods when intervention is
viewed as consistent with the direction of future monetary policy3 the regression of
exchange rate changes 00 intervention may provide statistically significant coefficients in
the direction suggested hy effective intervention policy. However, for other periods, the
evidence may be insignificant or even in the wrong direction. The evidence in this paper
suggests. that the sample dependent nature of this evidence comes from the sample
dependent nature of monetary and intervention policy.
VU. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether U.S. foreign exchange interventions during the late
lD8Ds signalled a change in monetary policy. To address this question, we developed a
methodology allowing intervention to signal shifts in monetary policy regimes. We tested
and rejected the hypothesis that intervention provides no signal of future monetary policy.
Thus intervention was informative about future monetary policy over the period.
We also showed that this evidence should not be constructed as an argument in
favor of intervention, however, Indeed, the estimates indicate that interventions signalled
future monetary policy in the opposite direction from the signalling hypothesis for much of
the period. For example, dollar sales in the foreign exchange market were frequently
255ee, for example, Dominguex and Frankel (1992).
29followed by contractionary monetary policies. Furthermore, if interventions did not occur
for some period of time, a new episode of intervention was viewed as only 30 percent to 43
percent likely to provide a signal in the correct direction.
When traders view intervention as signalling monetary policy changes in the
opposite direction, these interventions are useful for predicting the future. However, when
intervention is perceived by the market as providing information that monetary policy will
move in the opposite direction than suggested by the intervention, the implied movements
in the exchange rate will also tend to move perverseLy. For example, using data on
exchange rate changes on the days following interventions viewed as conveying incorrect
signals, all significant movements in the exchange rate were in the opposite direction
intended by the intervention. As a result, these types of interventions can be very costly in
terms of the required intervention volume. This problem was evident during 1989 and 1990
when dollar sales intervention in the face of continued tight monetary policy forced the Fed
to acquire foreign currency holding beyond its legal limit.
The approach taken in this paper suggests several directions for future research.
First, we assumed that if the Fed has not intervened for a period of time, traders do not
use past information about the credibility of intervention as a signal. However, past
information about whether central banks signalled correctly may potentially be important.
Second, we have assumed that the transitinn probabilities of changes in the credibility of
the signals are constant over time. In reality, these probabilities are likely to be functions
of variables such as the state of the economy. Therefore, future research should address
this possibility. Third, our short sample period precludes considering a reaction fu.nction
that depended upon real variables that are only available at longer time intervals. An
analysis of monetary policy based upon these variables would be a useful robustness check
on our results. Fourth, since the exchange rate depends upon the domestic money supply
relative to foreign money supply, the Fed may be signalling changes in relative monetary
policy. While this paper has focused upon domestic money supply alone, the essential
30
avariables signalled by intervention may be the relative tightness of US. policy relative to
its trading partners-
Overall, this paper represents an important first attempt at testing whether and
how intervention interacts with future shifts in money supply. As such, it also points to a
new direction for research on the potential effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention.
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33APPENDIX
Estiraatiou Procedure of the Markov—S witching Model without Intervention as a Signal
The switching regime model in Section IV is estimated under the assumption that
traders do not observe the monetary regime, which must he inferred based on the
observationofcurrentandpastvaluesofthemonetaryindicator
(t1{dsxt,Axi ,..,Ax1}).The optimal forecast of this process can be thought as the
following sequence of steps. For any period t, traders have a certain prior about the
pro babitity of being in Regime 1 based on past information.
(Al)?rior(R=l) =(l_A)Post(Rtj=fl+A[t_Post(ltti=l)]
where Prior(R=l)=Prob(R= flAx11Ax1), Post(R1=l.)=Frob(R1=l [Ax1




where f(Axt IRt=i)=((l/2)rc2)2exp(_1/2(Axt_6?_.EtAxti)2/ 2)Finally, they




They update repeatedly over the entire sample using (Al)-(A3).
The estimation procedure is simple enough. Start at 1=1 with a prior about being
in Regime 1. Using (A1)—(A3), ccnslruct the sample log likelihood function
T
(A4)in 1(AxtAx1 1..Ax1) = Inf(AxtIAxt,...,Axi)




Estimation Proceduie of the Maxkov'-.Switching Model with Intervention as a Signal
The switching regime model in Section V is also estimated under the assumption that
traders do not observe the monetary regime which must be inferred based on the
observation of current and past values of the monetary indicator and the intervention
signal (4={xt,St,Itk...AxlSlIlk}).To learn about the monetary regime and
about the information content of intervention in the foreign exchange market, rational
investors follow a Bayesian strategy. Each period they start with a prior about the
monetary regime and about the informational regime
(A5)Prior(Rt=1) = (l_2A)Post(R 1=fl+A
(AG)Prior(Ct) = {o}(15t){(1_2PWost(0_1) + p}8t_l[qjD_5t_l)}5t
where Post(C)=Prob(C5 I) andPost(Rt=i)=Proh(R1=i 4i). Every period investors
obtain more information on monetary policy and foreign exchange intervention and
estimate the joint density function of Ax, St1 and
(A7) f(ax1s,Ik I =[f(tXx1 t_l) t)[f(sxtJtk I
In(A?), when there is no signal, S=O, the model collapses to the Hamilton (1988) model.
In this case f(Ax1 It1)isthe marginal density of the monetary indicator and it is
described in equation (As). When there is a signal, S=l, the model collapses to the
Kaminsky (1991) signalling model. In this case f(Axtl k is the joint density of the
intervention signal and the monetary indicator. This joint density function is depicted in
(A9):






where f(x IRt=i)=(/2)1rcr2)1/2exp(_l/2(Axt_6?_E oxt.)2/u2). Thisnew
j=lJ




whereFost(Rt=1 S=l) Post(Rt=l IS=0)and Post(Ct! St=l) are defined in equations
(A12)—(A14).
f(AxI R=l)Prior(R:=l)
(Al2) Post(R =115 =0) = tt
f(Ax I
IRt=1)Prior(R (Pt)'t_k(l_Pni0r(Ct))'t_k (Ala) Post(Rt=l I
f(x ,Itij4i)
[fi(zhxt)?rior(Rt= 1)]1t—k[ fo(xt)Prior(Rt=0)]'t_k
(A14) Post(Ct ISt=1)=Prior(Ct) f(Axt,ItkItl )
whereft(Axt) =f(AxIRt=i).The above model can be estimated as follows. Start at t=l
with a prior of being in Regime 1 and of being in a "Correct Signals" regime. Using
(A5)—(A14), construct the sample log likelihood
T
(Am) ln(f(Axl,StIk 1, =tlmn(f(A1t,St,tt_k I
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Table 2
Markov Switching Model for Ml and the Federal Funds Rate




Estimate 0.0479 0.3324 0.9425 0.3293
Standard Error 0.0265 0.0740 0.84340.0162
t—Statistic 1.8087 4.4689 1.117620.3250
Federal Funds Rate
Estimate 0.0351—0.2599—0.0442—0.4795 1.2934 0.1854
Standard Error 0.0252 0.1131 0.0211 0.1050 1.24440.1854
t—Statistic 1.3891—2.2971—2.0949—4.5677 1.0397 1.0397














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1905 1966 1067 1958 1989
Indox.1965:1—100
190
1985 1996 1907 1988 1989199S
Figure 2: Fror Probabilities oi an Exoansionarv Monetary Regime
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Figure 3;
Prior Probabilities Implied by the Signalling Model
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